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THE LIKELY EMPLOYMENT IMPACT OF 
REMOVING UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
PROTECTION  
Benoit Freyens and Paul Oslington 
The impact of hiring and firing costs on labor markets has been intensely 
debated in many countries in recent years. In Australia the focus has been 
on the impact of unfair dismissal provisions. The government has 
asserted that unfair dismissal provisions stop firms taking on workers, 
and that the burden falls most heavily on small businesses. 
Despite intense debate we know very little about dismissal costs. How 
large are they? What are the main components and their relative 
magnitudes? How do they vary across industries and occupations? Does 
the size of the firm matter?  Finally, what impact do dismissal costs have 
on employment, and what is the likely impact on employment of the 
proposed changes to unfair dismissal laws? A previous article by 
Oslington (2005) discussed the current state of knowledge on these 
questions. This paper uses data from a large scale survey of dismissal 
costs in Australian small businesses to estimate the impact on 
employment, in conjunction with  a simple neo-classical labour demand 
model. The impact of unfair dismissal costs on employment is found to 
be small, certainly much smaller than claimed by the government. 
Government Claims  
The Prime Minister has suggested that removing unfair dismissal 
protection for workers employed in small businesses is the key to 
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reducing unemployment below 5%.  A figure of 77, 000 new jobs created 
has been widely quoted by the government.  
These assertions seem to be based on two studies.   The first is the CPA 
(2002) Small Business Survey.  This was an opinion survey in which 5% 
of business respondents agreed with the suggestion that unfair dismissal 
laws are an impediment to hiring staff.  Assuming that each of these 
respondents would hire one extra worker if the laws were relaxed, and 
that the respondents are representative of the population of Australian 
firms, yields an estimate of 52,575 jobs created by removing unfair 
dismissal protection.  
The 77,000 figure comes from a different study which, selectively read, 
provides the second basis of the Prime Minister’s assertions.  This study 
by Don Harding (2002) was commissioned by the Federal Government’s 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations.  It involved 
surveying 1802 employers through the Yellow Pages Business Index.  
Harding discussed problems with existing opinion surveys – such as bias 
arising from the use of leading questions, and strategic responses from 
firms who have an interest in policy changes flowing from the survey. 
Harding adopted a different approach to previous surveys, focusing on 
respondents with no employees who previously had employees, and 
seeking employer reasons for the change.  Adding up the previous 
employees of respondents who nominated unfair dismissal provisions as 
playing a major role in the change, and factoring up to the population 
yields an estimated employment effect of 34,812 jobs. Adding and 
factoring up for those who nominated unfair dismissal provisions as 
playing a minor or moderate role yields a total of 77,482 jobs lost.  
Harding’s study also included a question about the impact of unfair 
dismissal laws on business costs, and applying a labour demand elasticity 
of 0.7 to the responses suggests an impact of unfair dismissal provisions 
on employment of 0.46 percent.  If total employment is about 9 million 
this is about 41,400 jobs.  Harding discusses some caveats to this 0.46 
percent estimate, but we also consider the wording of the cost question in 
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the survey to be too general1 to permit reliable inference about 
employment impacts.  
The most valuable part of Harding’s study is the discussion of the impact 
of unfair dismissal provisions on firms’ human resources policies, and on 
equity.  The survey was designed mainly to address these issues rather 
than employment impacts, which are subject to numerous caveats.  
Harding in fact writes that the focus on the employment impact of unfair 
dismissal laws is ‘undesirable and potentially misleading’.  None of these 
caveats seems have been mentioned by the government when quoting the 
77,000 jobs figure.  
In our view qualitative employer opinion surveys are not a suitable 
instrument for estimating the employment impact of dismissal costs.  To 
date, however, almost all Australian studies (of which Harding’s study is 
the most careful) have been of this type. 
Our Study  
Over the past three years the authors have been conducting a large 
Australian Research Council funded project on the employment impact 
of hiring and firing costs, at University of New South Wales at the 
Australian Defence Forces Academy in Canberra.  To our knowledge, 
the study is the first in the world to use large-scale quantitative survey 
evidence on dismissal costs in conjunction with economic models of firm 
behaviour.  A full description of the survey and results is Freyens and 
Oslington (2005).  
Our survey was conducted in 2004 and covered 1800 small and medium 
enterprises from the Sensis® Business Index, representing a workforce of 
33,356 full and part time employees.  All states and most industries and 
occupations were included.  We obtained 1438 responses, including 208 
enterprises reporting redundancies in the past five years and 597 
reporting fires (439 of which were not disputed, 121 of which were 
                                                 
1 The question did not ask specifically about costs of dismissal, but instead: ‘by how 
much, in dollars per year, do unfair dismissal laws increase your businesses’ 
costs?’ 
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resolved through conciliation, and 38 of which went to arbitration or the 
courts).  Redundancies in the survey are defined as involuntary 
terminations (we therefore exclude quits and retirements) coming from 
economic downturns, technological change, etc. – in other words for 
reasons not specific to the employee.  Fires, or dismissals for cause, on 
the other hand, are involuntary terminations for reasons specific to the 
employee, such as poor performance, misconduct, etc.  These fires may 
be unlawful if for reasons such as pregnancy, or they may be lawful but 
unfair.   An employee who considers their dismissal unfair can take the 
matter to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), or a 
corresponding State body, which will conciliate.  If this fails it may 
arbitrate and order reinstatement or compensation if the dismissal is 
judged ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.  It is this right to appeal against 
unfair dismissal through the AIRC that the Howard Government is 
seeking to remove for workers in businesses with less than 100 
employees. 
Overall, the survey data indicate that the average cost of an uncontested 
dismissal is $3,044 which represents 10.3 percent of average annual 
wage costs.  The average total cost of a contested dismissal settled 
through conciliation is $12,818 or 27.7 percent of annual wage cost.  For 
a dismissal requiring arbitration the cost averages $14,705 or 35.7 
percent of annual wage cost. Redundancies on average cost $18,900, or 
35.3 percent of annual wage cost.  These redundancy costs include 
procedural costs and any notice or severance payments.    
For all the costs there is some variation by occupation and industry, but 
the most interesting finding for the current debate is that there is no 
strong relationship between the costs and firm size.   An intriguing 
finding that we would like to follow up in future research work is that 
white collar workers are less likely to lodge an unfair dismissal claim 
but, when they do, they are more likely to be successful and receive 
higher average payouts (even as a proportion of wages).  The lower claim 
rate may be related to lower unionisation rates for white-collar workers 
in small businesses or to the greater ‘reputational risk’ for white collar 
workers lodging a claim.  It is certainly also related to the salary cap 
imposed by Federal and State legislation on the right to lodge a claim. 
Their greater success rates in courts may be due to white-collar workers’ 
60     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 56 
 
greater familiarity and confidence with claim procedures and ability to 
argue their case.  What type of workers benefit from the unfair dismissal 
laws matters a great deal – we may be more concerned about the removal 
of protection if low paid vulnerable workers can no longer claim than if 
the successful claimants are highly paid professionals. 
Employment Impact 
The main focus of our study is the overall impact on employment. We 
combined the survey data on dismissal costs with a standard neo-
classical model of labour demand.  In the simplest model, employment is 
set to equate the value of the marginal product of labor with the sum of 
the wage and the expected present value of dismissal costs.  Since 
dismissal costs are not incurred with certainty, we must use their 
expected present value.  This is calculated by multiplying the future costs 
by the probability that the worker’s employment spell will end in 
dismissal, to give the expected value. That future value is then 
discounted back to the present, using the standard present value formula 
with the number of years being the expected duration of employment for 
workers whose spell ends in dismissal, and a discount rate which 
approximates the firm’s return on alternative investments.  Figure 1 
illustrates the expected present value calculation: line A shows how 
future expected firing costs are discounted so as to give their present 
value at time t = 0 (pF is the probability of firing workers in the future 
and r is the discount rate used by firms to compute the present value of 
future firing costs). 
Using our survey data on firing costs, a firing probability of .03 and 
expected duration of 3.6 years (both from ABS data, as explained in 
Freyens and Oslington (2005)), and a discount rate of .05, gives an 
expected present value of firing costs of .0048 percent of annual wage 
cost.   The discount rate is at the lower end of plausible estimates, and 
using a higher figure would reduce the expected present value of firing 
costs (as shown by the line B in figure 1). 
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This expected present value of dismissal costs can be treated like any 
other labour cost, and a standard labour demand elasticity argument can 
be applied to estimate an employment impact.  We used a labour demand 
elasticity of 0.7, which is the centre of the range of estimates discussed 
by Lewis and MacDonald (2002), and the same as used by Harding 
(2002).  This procedure yields a predicted employment impact of 
removing the conciliation and arbitration elements of the costs of unfair 
dismissal at both Federal and State level of 11,600 jobs2. 
                                                 
2 We do not remove the time and administrative costs incurred (regardless of 
whether a dismissal is judged fair) because these elements are unlikely to be 
affected by policy. We believe it will always take some degree of management 







Firing costs (F) 














62     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 56 
 
Until the draft legislation is released we do not know what proportion of 
Australian workers will be covered by the changes (which depends on 
what happens with the integration of Federal and State systems, whether 
the government sets the threshold at firms with 100 employees, etc.).  If 
50% of workers are affected then the likely employment gains from 
removing unfair dismissal protection will be about 6,000 jobs.  This is a 
very small number in comparison with the government claims. 
As a test of the robustness of our methods, we checked what would be 
the employment impact of removing mandatory severance and notice 
requirements for all workers affected by economic dismissals.  Using our 
survey estimates of redundancy costs, a retrenchment probability of .14 
and expected job spell of 5.8 years (again from ABS data), and the same 
labour demand elasticity and discount rate, yields an employment impact 
of about 157,000 jobs.  Comparing this to our estimate 6,000 for 
removing unfair dismissal protection reinforces the tininess of the impact 
of unfair dismissal laws.  On the other hand, it would not be responsible 
to quote this 157,000 figure as an estimate of the potential gains from 
changes in redundancy policy.  The actual impact would be much smaller 
because bargained wages may rise to compensate for the removal of 
redundancy pay and many firms would still pay for fairness and 
reputation reasons (as they did before redundancy pay legislation was 
enacted). Our methodology ignores the business cycle, which does not 
matter much for unfair dismissal, but is very important for redundancy. 
The interaction between severance pay and bankruptcy provisions for 
small business would also need careful attention before any firm 
conclusions about impacts of retrenchment policy changes could be 
drawn.  This is because the force of redundancy provisions is greatly 
reduced if the redundancies bankrupt the small business and leave 
employees out of pocket. 
Additional Considerations 
Getting back to the proposed changes to unfair dismissal provisions, 
although we have focused on employment impacts, other issues need to 
be considered when judging the changes.   One such issue is productivity 
losses because firms carry workers who would have been fired but for 
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unfair dismissal protection.  There is no obvious way to estimate such 
productivity losses, but some small business spokespersons claim that 
these costs of carrying unproductive workers are substantial.   A related 
claim is that there are productivity losses from a lack of worker 
discipline which is alleged to be associated with unfair dismissal 
protection.  We are unimpressed by such arguments because unfair 
dismissal protection, if properly designed, does not stop firms firing 
unproductive workers, just from treating workers in a harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable manner.  If these arguments have any weight they are 
arguments for further fine-tuning the procedures rather than for removing 
protection. 
Another issue is higher costs for employers from casualisation of their 
workforces to avoid unfair dismissal costs.  It is difficult to quantify the 
extent to which this has occurred.  We have some anecdotal evidence in 
the written comments from another survey of hiring and firing costs in 
large enterprises, conducted in conjunction with the Australian Human 
Resources Institute in 2004.   There is also some anecdotal evidence of 
fires being renegotiated into redundancies by firms to avoid unfair 
dismissal cases.  Redundancy payouts depend on duration of 
employment, and we would expect firms to have an interest in 
renegotiating fires for short duration workers where the reputational costs 
of firing are large for firms, or where firms are particularly risk averse.  
‘Reputational costs’ will also induce workers to accept such 
renegotiations of fires into redundancies.  The great advantage of 
redundancies compared to fires is that nothing is paid to third parties 
such as lawyers.  In this sense, redundancy is more efficient for the 
parties.  To the extent that renegotiation into redundancies hides some of 
the costs of firing, we would have to increase our cost estimates and their 
employment impact. However, it would be extremely difficult to quantify 
the extent of such ‘hidden fires’.  
Perhaps the most important additional consideration is equity.  As 
discussed above, we have some evidence of the pattern of unfair 
dismissal claims by occupation, which gives us some idea of the types of 
workers benefiting from unfair dismissal protection, but we need to know 
more before drawing any conclusions about the equity implications of 
unfair dismissal protection.  Harding (2002) argues that unfair dismissal 
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protection is inequitable because it benefits employed ‘insiders’, and 
reduces the job prospects of unemployed ‘outsiders’. However, this 
argument only has weight if there are substantial employment losses, 
which our study suggests is not the case. 
Concluding Remarks 
It has been somewhat disheartening to observe the process that has led to 
the proposed changes to unfair dismissal policy.  If, as advocated by the 
government, the main reason for the removal of unfair dismissal 
protection is to create a large number of jobs, one would normally expect 
the proposal to be backed by sound evidence about the negative impact 
of the existing provisions.  This is clearly not the case.   
As the debate has developed in the past few months, in the press and the 
Senate inquiry into the proposed changes, neither side of the debate has 
shown much interest in the details of the few studies of the impact of 
unfair dismissal procedures.  It has been a battle of political spin waged 
on our television screens and newspapers.  The study reported in this 
article cost a little over $100,000 of public funds (plus salaries and 
overheads), and the combined costs of all the studies is dwarfed by the 
millions of dollars of public funds being spent by the Government on 
promoting the proposed changes.  It is the responsibility of academics to 
continue to undertake and publicise the results of independent research, 
regardless of the state of policy debate in Australia.    
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